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I. Introduction
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements ("the
Convention" or "COCA") is aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of choice of
court agreements (also known as forum selection clauses) between parties to
international commercial transactions, as well as the enforceability of
judgments resulting from such agreements.2 The Convention provides
greater certainty to companies and individuals doing business across borders
and thus helps facilitate international trade and investment.
The Convention enjoys universal support in the United States, but its
transmittal to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification has been held
up by disagreements over whether it should be implemented by federal law
or by a combination of federal and state law. This is unfortunate, as the
Convention was originally a U.S.-led project, and the longer the impasse
continues, not only are U.S. companies denied the benefits of the
Convention, but the less credibility the United States will have in
negotiating future private international law treaties.
This memorandum proposes to resolve the impasse by, as a general
matter, implementing Chapter II of the Convention (addressing the
enforcement of choice of court agreements) through a cooperative
1. The ABA Section of International Law Working Group on the Implementation of the
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements was tasked by the Chair of the American
Bar Association Section of International Law (ABA-SIL) with proposing a framework for
implementation of the Convention in the United States. The views expressed in this
Memorandum are solely those of the individual members of the Working Group and do not
represent the views of their respective law firms or law schools, the American Bar Association
(ABA), its Section of International Law or any other ABA entity. The Working Group includes
Glenn P. Hendrix, Atlanta, Georgia (Chair); Ronald J. Bettauer, Washington D.C.; Robert B.
Brodegaard, New York, New York; Theodore J. Folkman, Boston, Massachusetts; Guy S. Lipe,
Houston, Texas; Edward M. Mullins, Miami, Florida; Steven M. Richman, Princeton, New
Jersey; David P. Stewart, Washington D.C.; Louise Ellen Teitz, Providence, Rhode Island; and
Peter Winship, Dallas, Texas.
2. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (June 30, 2005) [hereinafter COCA].
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federalism approach and Chapter III (addressing the enforcement of
judgments) through federal law. The compromise proposal gives something
to both sides in the current impasse. It yields to federal law one aspect of the
recognition and enforcement of judgments (those within the scope of
COCA), but it also expands the role of state law in the area of enforcement
of choice of court (forum selection) agreements, because at present, most
federal courts sitting in diversity apply federal law in determining the
enforceability of forum selection clauses. Under the Working Group
proposal, the state uniform act would be applied at the dispute stage in both
federal and state courts, if enacted by the state in which the court sits.
This resolution does not simply represent a political compromise. As
explained below, there are principled bases for distinguishing between the
respective roles of state and federal law with respect to Chapters II and III of
the Convention.
A. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS
The Convention is the litigation counterpart to the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (the "New York Convention"). It was approved by the members of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 2005. The following
year, the American Bar Association ("ABA") urged the United States
government "promptly to sign, ratify and implement" the Convention.3 The
report accompanying the 2006 ABA resolution observed that:
The U.S., not a party to any bilateral or multilateral convention on the
enforcement of foreign judgments, sought to find a means for private
parties to enforce foreign judgments outside of the U.S. without re-
litigation and to "level the playing field" for litigants in the U.S. U.S.
litigants trying to enforce U.S. judgments abroad have a more difficult
time than those seeking to enforce foreign judgments in the U.S. The
Convention from a U.S. perspective is focused directly on the exporting
of U.S. judgments, making them more enforceable across borders. The
Convention would enforce forum selection clauses and resulting
judgments, much as the New York Convention does with arbitration
clauses and subsequent arbitral awards. The Convention has the
potential to offer increased certainty for consensual commercial
transactions.4
The Convention was signed by the United States in January 2009, but has
been treated as non-self-executing and thus requires implementing
legislation. It has not been transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent
due to a dispute over whether domestic implementation of the Convention
should occur exclusively through federal law or through a combination of
federal and state legislation.
3. ABA Resolution No. 123A, 1 (Aug. 7, 2006).
4. Id. at 2.
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In addressing the federalism issue, it is helpful to focus on the two primary
areas covered by the Convention: (1) jurisdiction over the merits of the
dispute (the "dispute stage") and (2) recognition and enforcement of
judgments (the "recognition stage"). Generally speaking:
* Chapter II of the Convention covers the dispute stage, providing for
the enforcement of a choice of court (forum selection) clause in a
commercial "business to business" contract, obligating the chosen
court to exercise jurisdiction and hear the matter when a dispute arises,
and requiring non-chosen courts to refrain from hearing the dispute;
* Chapter III of the Convention covers the recognition stage, requiring
recognition and enforcement of any resulting judgment rendered by
the chosen court.5
B. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE ABA-SIL WORKING GROUP PROPOSAL
The ABA Section of International Law Working Group on the
Implementation of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
(the "Working Group") was tasked by the Chair of the ABA Section of
International Law with proposing a resolution to the present impasse that
would allow the Convention to be implemented in the United States.
The Working Group proposes the following:
* Chapter II of the Convention would be implemented through what
has been termed "cooperative federalism," involving parallel federal
and state legislation, allowing states to opt out of the federal statute
and instead implement the Convention through adoption of a uniform
act developed by the Uniform Law Commission ("ULC") in close
consultation with the U.S. State Department. The uniform state law
would address the enforcement of the choice of court clause, the
obligation of the chosen court to hear the case, and the requirement
that non-chosen courts refrain from hearing the case. The federal
implementing law would not establish federal court jurisdiction at the
dispute stage, absent diversity or some basis for federal question
jurisdiction independent of COCA. In actions brought in federal court
in a state that has enacted the uniform state act, the state law would be
applied (unless preempted as contrary to federal law or the
Convention). In states that have not enacted the uniform state act, the
federal implementing legislation would be applied in both state and
federal courts.
* Chapter III of the Convention would be implemented by the federal
legislation, with no parallel state uniform implementing legislation.
The federal law would provide for federal court jurisdiction,
concurrent with state court jurisdiction, in all cases involving the
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment governed by the
Convention (i.e., not only where diversity is satisfied).
5. The general rules stated for both Chapters II and III are subject to certain enumerated
exceptions.
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II. Other Approaches to Federal-State Implementation of the
Convention
Before turning to the merits of the Working Group proposal, we will
briefly outline other approaches that have been advocated in connection
with the implementation of the Convention:
A. THE FEDERAL-ONLY APPROACH
This approach would federalize both the dispute stage (Chapter II) and
the recognition stage (Chapter III). Congress would enact implementing
legislation analogous to Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"),
which implements the New York Convention in the United States, and
which addresses both the arbitration agreement-enforcement stage of court
proceedings (when a district court is considering an action or motion to
compel or stay a lawsuit pending arbitration) and the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards. The federal statute would expressly provide
for federal court jurisdiction, concurrent with state court jurisdiction, in all
cases at both the dispute stage and the recognition stage, not just where
diversity is satisfied.
B. THE STATE DEPARTMENT's APRIL 16, 2012 "WHITE PAPER"
APPROACH
In a "White Paper" issued on April 16, 2012, the State Department's
Legal Adviser outlined a "cooperative federalism" approach, whereby
Congress would enact a federal statute implementing the Convention, but
states could opt out of the federal law and instead be governed by that state's
enactment of a uniform act developed by the ULC.6 The uniform state act
would address both the dispute stage and the recognition stage. The federal
implementing law and the uniform state act would be functionally identical,
with variations occurring only to the extent required by the differing federal
and state contexts. The White Paper contemplated federal preemption
under the following circumstances
[I]f states adopt the uniform law but vary its text substantively, or if
courts interpret state law so as to produce different results from those
that would obtain under the federal law, state law will to that extent be
preempted by the federal statute. The result is that substantive
differences in application of state or federal law should be minimal,
while at the same time permitting state courts to apply state law
wherever possible.7
The White Paper specified that federal courts would apply the federal
statute-at both the dispute stage and the recognition stage-even in a
6. See U.S. Department of State, Implementation of the Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements in the United States (Apr. 16, 2012).
7. Id. at 3-4.
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diversity action, and regardless of whether the court was located in a state
that has adopted the state uniform act.
C. THE ULC's COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM APPROACH
As we understand it, the ULC approach is essentially the same as the State
Department's April 16, 2012 White Paper approach, but with the critical
difference that the federal court would apply the uniform state law, if
enacted by that state.8 The ULC objected to this aspect of the White Paper,
stating that it would "significantly diminish[ ] the effect of state substantive
law in litigation since state legislation enacted to implement the Convention
would apply only if the litigation were heard in state courts in the enacting
state and not if the litigation were in federal courts located in that state."9
The Conference of Chief Justices ("CCJ") appears to be aligned with the
ULC. In 2010, the CCJ adopted a resolution "urg[ing] the United States
Congress to enact Convention-implementing legislation that takes a
'cooperative federalism' approach that would avoid unilateral, compulsory
preemption of relevant state jurisprudence and would encourage states to
adopt a uniform international choice of court agreements act that is
consistent with federal guidelines."o In July 2012, the CCJ declined to
support the State Department's April 16, 2012 White Paper approach,
apparently on the same ground that the ULC rejected it."
III. Momentum Seems to Favor Federal-Only Implementation
of the Convention
There seem to be no near-term prospects for ratification of the
Convention by the United States, absent agreement among the key
stakeholders regarding its implementation. Taking a longer view, some
members of the Working Group believe that momentum favors eventual
federal-only implementation of the Convention for the reasons set forth
below.12
8. For more on the ULC's perspective on cooperative federalism, see Robert A. Stein,
Strengthening Federalism: The Uniform State Law Movement in the United States, 99 MINN. L.
REv. 2253, 2271 (2015); William H. Henning, The Uniform Law Commission and Cooperative
Federalism: Implementing Private International Law Conventions Through Uniform State Laws, 2
ELON L. REv. 39 (2011).
9. Letter from Michael Houghton, President, ULC, to Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S.
Department of State, 2 (May 22, 2012).
10. Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution 10-A-02, Urging the United States Government
to Respect State Policies and Principles of Federalism with Regard to Enacting Legislation to
Implement the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (July 28, 2010).
11. See National Center for State Courts, Hague Convention on Choice of Courts, available at
http://www.ncsc.org/Services-and-Experts/Government-Relations/International/Hague-
Convention-on-Choice-of-Courts.aspx.
12. Some of the conclusions expressed in Section III. of this Memorandum are not shared by
all members of the Working Group.
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A. THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT'S APPROACH AS OF JANUARY 19,
2013
In its most recent public pronouncement on the implementation of the
Convention, issued on January 19, 2013, the State Department had shifted
from advocating a cooperative federalism approach, at either the dispute
stage or the recognition stage, to favoring federal-only implementation
(while also stating that it remained open to "new proposals from key
stakeholders regarding how the package of issues under the cooperative
federalism approach might be restructured to gain wider support").3
The position of the State Department's Legal Adviser in that regard
evolved as the impasse over the White Paper continued with the ULC. In
responding to the State Department's White Paper in a May 22, 2012 letter,
the ULC indicated that it could "actively support [the State Department's]
proposed compromise . . . if there is removal from the compromise of the
portion which applies the provisions of the federal implementing legislation
when an action is brought in a federal court."1
The State Department responded that "the ULC's response - rejection of
the proposal on applicable law in federal court and acceptance of the other
aspects of the proposal - represents no compromise, as those other aspects
reflect positions already advocated by the ULC."s The State Department
emphasized that the White Paper approach represented a compromise
package; that without the applicable law element, the rest of the package
could not stand; and that if a cooperative federalism approach were pursued
without the applicable law element, a new package would have to be
developed that addressed the concerns of the various stakeholders in
different ways.1 6 The Legal Adviser further stated:
13. U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of the Legal Adviser regarding United States
Implementation of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (an. 19, 2013),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/2013/206657.htm.
14. Letter from Michael Houghton, President, ULC, to Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S.
Department of State, supra note 9, at 5.
15. Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to Michael
Houghton, President, ULC, 2 July 2, 2012).
16. In full, this paragraph of the Legal Adviser's letter stated: "Second, and as important, we
think after extended discussion with all stakeholders - that our proposed approach is the only
possible compromise among stakeholders with strongly divergent views and interests that
recognizes the various concerns and also has a basis in precedent. We recognize that the ULC
has important interests at stake, but as you know, other constituencies do as well. As you are
aware, a number of individuals and groups, many involved in international litigation practice,
have argued strongly that the COCA should be implemented in the same manner as the New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, i.e., with
express original federal court jurisdiction (concurrent with state court jurisdiction). Such
stakeholders have questioned the need for parallel state implementing legislation at all. They
see the adoption of a cooperative federalism approach, and the absence of original federal
jurisdiction, as major concessions. The prevailing response of the stakeholders we consulted
was that they were prepared to make those concessions in the context of the compromise
proposed in our paper if necessary to enable the United States to ratify the COCA, although a
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[W]e think that the approach outlined in [the White Paper] is a
principled one that balances federal and state interests. As discussed in
the paper, U.S. policy interests are best served by having federal courts
apply federal law in this situation, for several reasons:
(1) As a matter of principle, where a federal statute has been
developed to implement a treaty, federal courts should apply it.
(2) Applying federal law would simplify the task for federal courts,
which would not need to interpret state law or analyze whether
state law should be preempted.
(3) Applying federal law would promote the development of
jurisprudence on interpretation of that law, which is key to
determining whether federal law should preempt state law in a
given case. That would promote greater uniformity in treaty
implementation.
(4) Applying federal law would make the implementation process
more direct, more transparent, and more attractive to potential
treaty partners and foreign litigants.7
The ULC held to its position, maintaining that the State Department
proposal would represent a "radical departure from the long-standing
doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins," and stating that:
[T]he proposed compromise would establish an unacceptable precedent
for the future implementation of any convention for which
implementation by coordinated federal and state substantive legislation
is contemplated. The ULC is currently collaborating with the State
Department on such a project at this very moment, as the ULC is
drafting revisions to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act to implement the Hague Convention on the
Protection of Children. While no decisions have yet been made
concerning the relationship between federal and state law in the
implementation of this Convention, it seems clear that if the
Convention cannot be implemented by "conditional spending" -
federal legislation that, as with the Hague Family Maintenance
Convention and the 2008 amendments to the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act, requires states to enact the implementing uniform
legislation or risk losing access to substantial related federal funding -
the Protection of Children Convention will have to be implemented by
common theme was that too much had already been given away. Also, we have recently been
advised that the Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction of the Judicial Conference of the
United States has considered our proposed approach and can accept it. We note that the ULC's
response-rejection of the proposal on applicable law in federal court and acceptance of the
other aspects of the proposal-represents no compromise, as those other aspects reflect
positions already advocated by the ULC. Absent some flexibility, we see no way forward." Id. at
1-2.
17. Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to Michael
Houghton, President, ULC, supra note 15, at 1.
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coordinated federal and state legislation. If your proposal for
implementation of the Choice of Court Convention were applied in the
case of the Protection of Children Convention, the consequences would
be even more disruptive to the federal/state balance. Thus the ULC is
concerned that the proposed compromise implementation methodology
for the Choice of Court Convention, in addition to being unnecessary
in the particular situation, will have significant and unpredictable
implications for the implementation of other private international law
conventions in the future. The result could be that, even if in the future
a particular convention is implemented by coordinated federal and state
legislation, the effect of that state legislation will be limited to actions
brought in state courts.'8
The ULC and the State Department did not come to an agreement, and
in a memorandum datedJanuary 19, 2013, the Legal Adviser stated that "[a]s
of this date, my judgment is that the federal-only approach is the most
promising available path that would achieve simplicity, uniformity and
predictability in the implementation of the Convention."19 The Legal
Adviser indicated that "the Department should focus its energies upon the
federal-only approach in order to complete this important implementation
effort," while remaining open to "new proposals from key stakeholders
regarding how the package of issues under the cooperative federalism
approach might be restructured to gain wider support."20
B. THE PRACTICING BAR LARGELY FAVORS FEDERAL
IMPLEMENTATION
Lawyers representing American companies that are engaged in
international business tend to favor federal-only implementation of the
Convention. This was reflected, for instance, in the responses to requests
for comments from members of the ABA Section of International Law in
2011 and 2012. The following bullets in a letter from the International
Commercial Disputes Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York capture the recurring themes in many of the comments:
* The enforcement of international choice-of-court agreements and
judgments is a matter of international and foreign commerce that is
most appropriately governed by federal law which, in turn, federal
courts have a paramount interest in applying.
* The New York Convention allocation of federal and state court
jurisdiction has worked exceptionally well in practice, and therefore
serves as a useful model for the implementation of the Convention.
18. Letter from Michael Houghton, President, ULC, to Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S.
Department of State, 2 (Sept. 4, 2012).
19. Memorandum of the Legal Adviser Regarding U.S. Implementation of the Hague
Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements, supra note 13.
20. Id.
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* Federal courts construing the New York Convention have developed
expertise and created a body of precedent (e.g., with respect to
challenges to the enforcement of arbitration awards on jurisdiction,
due process and public policy grounds) that will provide guidance and
promote uniformity in addressing similar issues that will arise under
the Choice-of-Court Convention.
* The stated goal of the Choice-of-Court Convention to level the
playing field as between international arbitration and court
proceedings simply cannot be achieved unless the same federal court
enforcement regime is provided for Convention judgments as is
available under the New York Convention for international arbitration
awards. Indeed, it is hard for those of our Committee members who
are engaged in private practice to imagine advising clients to switch
from arbitration to litigation if litigation judgments do not enjoy the
same federal court enforcement benefits as are afforded international
arbitration awards.21
The State Department's Legal Adviser received the same feedback
directly from practitioners and various bar groups.22
C. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS HAS ALREADY BEEN
PARTLY FEDERALIZED
The current federal/state balance on the issue of recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments is not immutable. The exclusive
competence of state law with respect to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments began only in 1938.23 And although state law retains its
primacy in this area, Congress passed federal legislation in 2010-the
SPEECH Act-which prohibits the recognition and enforcement of foreign
defamation judgments that do not comport with U.S. Constitutional notions
of free speech.24
D. PARALLELS WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION
The Choice of Court Convention bears some similarities to the 1958 New
York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral agreements
and awards. That convention is consistently heralded as one of the most
2 1. Letter from Bruno Kimmelman, Chair, International Commercial Disputes Committee of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Oct. 21, 2011).
22. See Memorandum of the Legal Adviser Regarding U.S. Implementation of the Hague
Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements, supra note 13.
23. See American Law Institute, RECOGNITION & ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:
ANALYSIs & PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 2 (2006). As best we can determine, the earliest
federal case to look to state law in an action to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment was
Compania Mexicana Rediodifusora Franteriza v. Spann, 41 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Tex. 1941) (citing
Erie to rely on Texas public policy in enforcing Mexican judgment).
24. See Pub. L. 111-223 (Aug. 10, 2010), codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05.
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successful private international law treaties, and its implementation through
Chapter 2 of the FAA helped ensure its successful operation in the United
States.
Yet the prospects for U.S. ratification of the New York Convention were
initially grim, for some of the same reasons discussed above. Indeed, the
American delegation to the drafting conference for the New York
Convention "recommend[ed] strongly that the United States not sign or
adhere to the convention."25 Thus, the United States was not among the
twenty-four countries that signed the New York Convention in 1958. In
fact, the Convention was not ratified in the United States until 1970, when it
became the thirty-seventh country to join the treaty.26
As with COCA, the primary holdup to ratification of the New York
Convention was concern that its implementation would intrude upon states'
rights. The U.S. delegation to the drafting conference for the New York
Convention concluded that its ratification "would raise problems of Federal-
State relations," adding that "[t]his is a matter of particular concern because
arbitration historically has been preeminently a field for State action."27 The
delegation's report continued by stating:
Adherence to the convention would be looked upon as a sudden Federal
intrusion in an area in which it hitherto had failed to exercise its
constitutional legislative authority to the full limits. The fact that this
intrusion would be accomplished by the treaty power and would affect
arbitrations otherwise lying outside Federal jurisdiction seemingly
might imply that the motive was more to curtail State rights than to
facilitate foreign trade arbitrations.28
Nevertheless, during the twelve years between 1958 and 1970, momentum
built in support of the New York Convention, especially in the business
community. Federalism concerns notwithstanding, the Convention was
implemented through federal legislation (specifically, Chapter 2 of the FAA).
As noted in the legislative history to FAA Chapter 2:
Although the United States participated in the Conference, the
Convention was not signed on behalf of our government at that time
because the American delegation felt that certain provisions were in
conflict with some of our domestic laws. According to the
administration, however, as a result of increasing support for the
25. 1958 Report of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Conference on International Commercial
Arbitration, 19 Am. REV. INT'L ARB. 91, 115 (2008).
26. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Chronological Table of Actions:
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York,
1958), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration/NYConven
tion status chronological.html.
27. 1958 Report of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Conference on International Commercial
Arbitration, supra note 25, at 116.
28. Id.; see also Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Conference
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961).
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convention (both within and without the Government), the United
States decided in favor of accession. . .. In the committee's view, the
provisions of [the federal implementing legislation] will serve the best
interests of Americans doing business abroad.29
The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements had less
momentum out of the gate than the New York Convention. By 2007,
two years after COCA was approved by the Hague Conference, only
Mexico had joined.30 Most observers believe that COCA's momentum
stalled as the world waited to see whether the United States would
ratify. It was largely due to U.S. efforts that the Hague Conference
undertook to work on the Convention, and the rest of the world
naturally looked to the United States to lead the way in implementing
It.
Yet the rest of the world is no longer waiting on the United States. The
European Union ("EU") approved the Convention in June 2015.31 With the
Convention having taken effect between twenty-seven EU member
countries and Mexico on October 1, 2015, a "bandwagon effect" can be
expected, with "a wave of new signings and ratifications throughout the
world."32 Singapore has already jumped on the bandwagon, signing the
Convention earlier this year.
As COCA gains momentum, and as happened with the New York
Convention, the U.S. business community can be expected to push for
ratification through federal legislation. Indeed, the U.S. Chamber has
already endorsed federal-only implementation.33
IV. The ABA-SIL Working Group Proposal
The Working Group includes both members who favor federal-only
implementation and members who lean toward cooperative federalism.
Nevertheless, all members of the Working Group recognize the value of the
Convention and seek to take up the challenge in the Legal Adviser's January
19, 2013 memorandum for "new proposals from key stakeholders regarding
how the package of issues under the cooperative federalism approach might
be restructured to gain wider support."34 To that end, the Working Group is
29. H.R. Rep. No. 91-1181, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601,
3601-602.
30. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Status Table: Convention of 30 June
2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, available at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/
conventions/status-table/?cid=98.
3 1. Id.
32. Rob Palmer & Michael Weatherby, The Hague Convention: The Next Big Thing in
International Dispute Resolution? (Apr. 2015), available at https://www.ashurst.cof/
doc.aspx?idContent=1 1824.
33. See U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, TAmING TORT TOURISM, at 30 (Sept.
2013).
34. See Memorandum of the Legal Adviser Regarding U.S. Implementation of the Hague
Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements, supra note 13. Likewise, the ULC has indicated
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united behind this compromise proposal to apply cooperative federalism
principles at the dispute stage and federal law at the recognition stage.
We advocate this compromise in part out of respect for the ULC's role as
an important stakeholder in the process. We recognize as well that the CCJ
supports the ULC's position.
Aside from such considerations, even those members of the Working
Group who favor federal-only implementation recognize that there are
principled bases for distinguishing between the dispute and recognition
stages, and that the case is less strong for federalizing the dispute stage than
the recognition stage, for the following reasons:
* There is an obvious role for state law in implementing Article 19 of
COCA, which provides that "[a] State may declare that its courts may
refuse to determine disputes to which an exclusive choice of court
agreement applies if, except for the location of the chosen court, there
is no connection between that State and the parties or the dispute."35
The State Department has indicated that upon acceding to the
Convention, it would make an Article 19 declaration with respect to
state courts (but not the federal courts). Thus, the Article 19 election
will be made by each U.S. state. Section 10 of the ULC's Choice of
Court Agreements Convention Implementation Act sets forth four
alternative versions of provisions that might be adopted by a U.S. state
in exercising the option under Article 19.36
* To the extent that there is existing legislation in this country
specifically addressing the enforceability of forum selection clauses, it
has been enacted by state legislatures, not Congress.37 More
importantly, the dispute stage of a proceeding potentially implicates
issues of state law that are outside of the Convention, including
whether there was actual or valid consent to a choice of court
that it is "committed to working closely with [the U.S. State Department] and others who are
interested in the successful U.S. ratification of this Convention to develop an alternative
proposal for implementing the Convention that might attract more widespread support."
Letter from Michael Houghton, President, ULC, to Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S.
Department of State, supra note 18, at 3.
35. COCA, supra note 2, art. 19.
36. Uniform Choice of Court Agreements Convention Implementation Act, Section 10 (July
18, 2012), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/choice of-court/2012am ccaia
approvedtext.pdf; see also Guy S. Lipe & Timothy J. Tyler, The Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements: Creating Room for Choice in International Cases, 33 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 1, 24
(2010) (observing that this provision allows "each state to make its own determination of
whether it wants its courts to hear cases without a connection to its state when the parties to the
dispute have designated a court in that state in an exclusive choice of court agreement").
37. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-413 et seq.; N.H. Rev. Stat. § 508-A:1 et seq.; N.D. Cent.
Code § 28-04.1; N.Y. Gen. Obligation Law, §§ 5-1401, 1402; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 23-B;
Montana Code § 28-2-708. While the federal venue transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
potentially implicates the enforcement of forum selection clauses, its direct focus is on non-
contractual transfers of cases from one U.S. federal district court to another based on
generalized considerations of convenience and fairness, and the statute has no application to
transfers to a court in a different country.
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agreement.38 Given that a court at the dispute stage will already be
focused on issues of state law (including, for instance, the generally
recognized grounds for invalidating an agreement, such as lack of
assent, fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence,
unconscionability, and lack of capacity, none of which will be
governed by federal law), there is some logic to having state law
govern the entire dispute stage. Insofar as courts and practitioners
look to state law with respect to so many of the issues regarding the
enforceability of forum selection clauses, implementation through a
uniform state act might afford practitioners and others affected by the
Convention better notice of its terms and hopefully help ensure that
general state contract formation/validity principles that are outside of
the Convention are aligned and integrated with the legislation
implementing the Convention.39
* Given that COCA's requirements at the dispute stage mandate that
state courts accept jurisdiction over certain cases and preclude them
from adjudicating others, the manner in which the Convention is
implemented is understandably a sensitive issue for state judiciaries
38. The Convention addresses only the formal validity of choice of court agreements, not
their substantive validity. With regard to formal validity, the agreement must be a writing or
equivalent, but additional formal requirements, such as bold print or type face, are not
permitted. COCA, supra note 2, art. 3(c); see Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Explanatory Report on the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention, ¶110, at 53
(2013). The Convention leaves to domestic law (which, in the U.S., means state, rather than
federal law) questions of substantive validity, but sets forth choice of law rules governing certain
aspects of that decision. Specifically, questions of whether an agreement is null and void are to
be made under "the law of the chosen court." COCA, supra note 2, art. 5(1). Thus, if a choice
of court agreement designated, say, a Georgia court as the forum, the validity of the agreement
would be determined under the whole law of Georgia, regardless of whether that determination
is made by the Georgia court or by any non-chosen court. The Convention does not set forth
standards for determining whether a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement and
specifically provides that the non-chosen court may decide questions of capacity under its law.
See id. art. 6(b). "Since there are no federal choice of law rules for contracts, the determination,
even by a federal court, will be according to the state in which the federal court is located. This
would suggest that individual state law on issues such as fraud, misrepresentation making a
contract void, duress, and undue influence would be available as defenses to a choice of court
agreement, as would the challenge to formation for lack of agreement." Memorandum from
Louise Ellen Teitz to ULC Drafting Committee on the Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements regarding "Effect of the Hague Choice of Court Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of the Choice of Court Agreements," 5-6 (June 10, 2008).
39. The notice issue is especially pertinent because COCA will not preempt existing state laws
regarding the enforceability of forum selection clauses in cases that are not deemed
"international" under the Convention. See COCA, supra note 2, arts. 1(2)-(3). For purposes of
COCA's dispute stage, a case is an "international case" unless the parties are residents of the
same Contracting State and the dispute is connected only with that State. See id. art. 1(2).
Moreover, the Convention does not cover choice of court agreements in consumer and
employment contracts, among other exclusions. See id. art. 2.
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and legislatures.40 Although Congress likely has the constitutional
authority to implement the Convention exclusively through federal
legislation under the treaty power (and more specifically, under its
powers to regulate foreign commerce, in conjunction with the
Necessary and Proper Clause), allowing states the option of
implementing the dispute stage of the Convention through a uniform
state act would afford greater respect to these sensitivities.
* Finally, there is a less compelling federal interest in how American
courts treat forum selection clauses between private parties than in
how American courts treat judgments issued by the courts of foreign
sovereigns. Accordingly, there is a weaker case for federalizing the
dispute stage than the recognition stage.
The ULC's meticulous drafting process results in exceptionally high
quality legislative product. The Working Group proposal would put much
of that legislative product-in the form of a shorter version of the Choice of
Court Agreements Convention Implementation Act-to good use. A
substantial portion of the ULC's Choice of Court Agreements Convention
Implementation Act could be transformed into a state uniform act for
purposes of implementing the Working Group's proposal. Based on our
preliminary review, all or parts of the following provisions of the uniform act
might be included: Articles 1-12, 25-30, and 32.41
Because the state uniform act would apply in both federal and state courts
at the dispute stage, this proposal avoids what the ULC has described as "an
unacceptable precedent" - namely, if a diversity action covered by the
Convention is commenced in or removed to a federal court located in a state
that has enacted the uniform state act, the provisions of the federal
implementing legislation, and not those of the state implementing
legislation, would control.42 Under the Working Group proposal (but unlike
the State Department's White Paper proposal), the state uniform act would
apply in that situation.43
40. See David P. Stewart, Implementing the Hague Choice of Courts Convention: The Argument in
Favor of "Cooperative Federalism, " in PAUL B. STEPHAN (ed.), FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS &
THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM, 160-61 (2014). For instance, in a matter covered by the Convention,
COCA would preclude a state court from declining jurisdiction based on forum non conveniens.
See COCA, supra note 2, art. 5(2).
41. Uniform Choice of Court Agreements Convention Implementation Act, supra note 36.
42. Letter from Michael Houghton, President, ULC, to Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S.
Department of State, supra note 18, at 1-2.
43. Although the State Department has taken the position that the federal implementing
statute should apply in federal diversity actions, it has not maintained that the Constitution or
any other authority mandates that outcome. See, e.g., Implementation of the Hague Convention
on Choice of Court Agreements in the United States, supra note 6, at 5. While there are
legitimate federal interests at stake, they are not so compelling-at least in the very specific
context of enforcing private choice of court agreements-as to thwart the compromise
proposed in this memorandum. Setting aside COCA, there are "substantial arguments" to be
made on both sides of the question whether state or federal law should apply to the
enforceability of forum selection clauses in diversity cases (in those instances that 28 U.S.C.
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V. Federal-State Balance
The Working Group proposal would readjust the federal-state balance,
but not in one direction. Rather, it would expand the role of federal law in
one area and of state law in another.
The proposal would federalize one distinct type of foreign judgment. The
Convention's scope is limited. It does not apply to exclusive choice of court
agreements to which a natural person acting primarily for personal, family or
household purposes (a consumer) is a party, or contracts of employment, or
any of the following matters, among others: claims for personal injury
brought by or on behalf of natural persons; maintenance obligations; other
family law matters, including matrimonial property regimes and other rights
or obligations arising out of marriage or similar relationships; wills and
succession; rights in rem in immovable property, and tenancies of immovable
property; tort or delict claims for damage to tangible property that do not
arise from a contractual relationship; the carriage of passengers and goods;
and the validity, nullity, or dissolution of legal persons, and the validity of
decisions of their organs.44 Thus, COCA covers only a "small area of
judgments"-those that result from exclusive choice of court agreements in
§ 1404 does not apply). GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INT'L CIVIL LITIGATION IN
U.S. COURTs (5th ed.) at 531-32 (2011). Most federal courts have applied federal law, but
"often without appearing to consider the basis for doing so." Id. at 539. Some federal courts
have held that The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) states a rule of substantive
federal common law that is applicable both in federal and state courts. See, e.g., cases cited at id.
at 541, but that view has been criticized. See, e.g., id. ("There is little reasoned support for this
view"); Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts: Limitations on Enforcement
After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 553, 559 (1993) ("Quite clearly, no uniquely
federal interest exists when a federal court sitting in diversity determines the enforceability of a
forum selection clause in a contract between private parties"). Other federal courts have applied
federal law on the basis that the enforcement of forum selection clauses implicates "procedure,"
"venue," and judicial docket control issues, but this view "does not address the equally clear
'substantive' attributes of forum selection clauses, which are contractual undertakings that are
bargained for and that significantly affect the parties economic interests." BORN & RUTLEDGE
at 540. A number of federal courts, albeit a distinct minority, have held that state law governs,
both in diversity actions and in state courts. See, e.g., General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta
Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 356, 57 (3d Cir. 1986) ("We must correct the assumption that
federal courts are bound as a matter of federal common law to apply The Bremen standard to
forum selection clauses [in diversity cases]. The construction of contracts is usually a matter of
state, not federal, common law."); see also Ryan T. Holt, A Uniform System for the Enforceability of
Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1913, 1927 (2009) ("While most
circuits that have directly confronted the question have applied federal law, the Third, Fourth,
and Eighth Circuits have applied state law in their analyses of whether a forum selection clause
should be enforced through a motion to dismiss."). As a practical matter, application of either
federal and state law typically yields the same outcome. See Heiser at 603 ("Nearly all states
endorse the Bremen doctrine or something like it. Consequently, enforcement of a reasonable
forum selection clause in most state courts is fairly certain.").
44. For a complete list of exclusions from the scope of the Convention, see COCA, Art. 2.
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business-to-business contracts.45 State law-including, where enacted, the
ULC's Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act and Uniform
Foreign Country-Money Judgments Recognition Act-would continue to
govern other types of foreign judgments.46 Setting aside the treaty power,
Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce arguably provides greater
authority for federalizing the particular subset of foreign judgments covered
by COCA than other types of foreign judgments (including those that might
be governed by some future treaty).47
At the dispute stage, the Working Group proposal would expand the role
of state law. At present, most federal courts apply federal law-generally the
test outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore48-in determining the enforceability of forum selection clauses, even
in actions based on diversity of citizenship (except that, as discussed above,
state contract law principles are applied in determining whether there was
actual or valid consent to the contract).49 Under the Working Group
proposal, however, federal courts would apply the state uniform act, if
enacted by the state in which the court sits, at the dispute stage. Thus, the
Working Group proposal would cede to the uniform state act ground that
most federal courts hold to be occupied by federal law.50 Furthermore, as
already discussed, Chapter 2 of the FAA addresses both the award-
enforcement stage and the arbitration agreement-enforcement stage of court
proceedings. The latter is the direct equivalent to COCA's dispute stage. If
the FAA Chapter 2 precedent were applied to the implementation of
COCA-as many advocate-the dispute stage would also be federalized.
Finally, unlike the State Department's April 16, 2012 White Paper
approach, the Working Group proposal would not set the precedent of
federal courts sitting in diversity disregarding a state's enactment of the
45. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Draft Uniform
International Choice of Court Agreements Act, Prefatory Note, at 4 July 2010), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/choice of-court/uicocaaamdraft-jul10.pdf.
46. Uniform Choice of Court Agreements Convention Implementation Act, Prefatory Note,
supra note 45, at 4-5; see also id. at 4-5 ("[T]here is only a limited area of overlap" between the
Convention and the ULC's uniform laws on the enforcement of foreign judgments).
47. U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, Cl. 3.
48. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
49. See Memorandum from Louise Ellen Teitz to ULC Drafting Committee on the Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 38, at 5-6 ("rWhen the litigation is in
federal court based on diversity of citizenship, courts tend to treat [the enforceability of forum
selection clauses] as 'procedural' for Erie purposes and look to federal law on both choice of
forum clauses and on venue"); Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection
Agreements, 66 HASTINGs LJ. 643, 665 (2015) ("As to enforceability [of forum selection
clauses], most diversity cases look to federal law"); BoRN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 43, at 531-
32 (observing that while the Supreme Court has not addressed the question whether federal or
state law applies to the enforceability of forum clauses in diversity cases, most lower federal
courts have applied federal law). It bears emphasizing, however, that the law in this area is
unsettled, and although most courts sitting in diversity have applied federal law, some have
applied state law. See discussion at infra., n. 36.
50. Id.
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uniform state act-something that the ULC has previously presented as a
make-or-break issue.
The aspects of the Convention that would be implemented through
cooperative federalism-all of those dealing with the enforcement of choice
of court agreements-are significant. Indeed, COCA's dispute stage
provisions have been described as the "the heart of the Convention."5'
Beyond the implementation of COCA, there is larger debate in some
quarters over whether the states should have a greater or lesser role in
implementing international treaties. No side in that debate can declare
victory with the Working Group proposal, which enlarges the role of state
law in one area and federal law in another. The appropriate federal-state
balance in implementing international treaties will vary treaty by treaty-
one size fits one. For this particular treaty, the Working Group proposal
strikes an appropriate balance.
The true "winners" under the Working Group proposal are American
businesses engaged in international commerce, which will be afforded a
more efficient and predictable legal regime for resolving cross-border
disputes, including more certain enforcement of forum selection clauses and
the ability to "export" U.S. court judgments and enforce those judgments
where assets are located. Those benefits are significant and are needed now.
VI. Conclusion
For some members of the Working Group, the proposal outlined in this
memorandum represents the best possible approach to implementing
COCA, combining some of the key advantages of the various other COCA
implementation proposals that have been advocated to date. For other
Working Group members who, on the one hand, would have preferred a
greater role for federal law, or on the other, would have preferred to
incorporate more elements of cooperative federalism, the Working Group
proposal is perhaps only the "next-best" approach to implementation.
Regardless, all members of the Working Group have coalesced around this
compromise as a principled, workable and appropriate means of
implementation, recognizing that after a ten-year delay in ratifying a treaty
with universal support and no political opposition from any quarter, it is
time for all concerned parties to play a constructive role in getting the
51. Hannah Ambrose & Vanessa Naish, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: A
Reciprocal Enforcement Regime to Rival to the New York Convention 1958? LEXOLOGY (Oct. 1,
2015); see also David P. Stewart, Implementing the Hague Choice of Courts Convention: The
Argument in Favor of "Cooperative Federalism," in STEPHAN, supra note 40, at 162 (The
Convention's requirements that "the court(s) chosen by the contracting parties to accept their
dispute and precluding non-chosen courts from doing so" lie "at the heart of the treaty");
Christophe Bernasconi, What to Expect from the Choice of Court Convention, INT'L FIN. L. REV.
(Sept. 22, 2014) (comments by the Secretary General of the Hague Conference describing
COCA's "primary objective" as giving "legal certainty and predictability to the contracting
parties regarding where to litigate a dispute that arises under their contract").
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Convention across the finish line. We urge all stakeholders to consider the
ABA-SIL Working Group proposal as a means of moving forward.
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